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Open economies, particularly emerging markets and commodity-
intensive economies, deal with large external shocks. These are typically
of a financial nature in the case of the former and real—in that they
affect the terms of trade—in the case of the latter. Alternative policy
reactions and policy setups may dampen or amplify the consequences
of these shocks, affecting the magnitude of the shock. It is therefore
very important to analyze and evaluate alternative policy setups and
policy reactions from different angles in order to draw lessons for the
macroeconomic management of open economies.
This paper revisits the recent experience of policy frameworks and
reactions in Australia, Brazil, and Chile. The objective of the paper is
twofold: to describe the recent experience of these countries by providing
an account of the macroeconomic policy framework and the policy reactions
to the major shocks of the past eight years, and to draw some policy
lessons. Taken together, the three cases are interesting for many reasons.
First, the three economies have recently faced important external shocks,
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derived from the Asian crisis in 1997–98 and the lower world growth and
higher risk aversion in 2001–02. Second, they all had an inflation-targeting
regime in place at the moment they faced the shocks we analyze, although
at rather different stages of maturity. Third, although they show
significant differences in their levels of macroeconomic and institutional
development, these in fact represent different phases of not-so-dissimilar
development patterns. Finally, each chose quite different policy reactions,
which enables us to analyze what could be important lessons.
The stage of maturity of the inflation-targeting regime in the three
countries was different in several dimensions.1 In 2002, Australia and
Chile were already on a steady-state inflation level, whereas in 1998
Chile was about to converge to that level and Brazil was still in transition.
Both the Brazilian and Chilean frameworks had annual targets in 1998,
whereas Australia and Chile had longer policy horizons in 2002. In 1998
Chile did not have a floating exchange rate regime. In 2002 Brazil had to
intervene in the foreign exchange market, while Chile made more limited
interventions and Australia’s interventions were even more limited.
Development heterogeneity is more marked than policy
framework differences in these three countries. While Australia has
a per capita income on par with industrialized countries, Brazil and
Chile still classify as emerging economies. Financial market depth
is also substantially different, with Australia having the most
developed market. Openness to trade is substantially lower in Brazil
than in the other two countries, while Chile ranks as the most open
economy. Finally, two relevant features of these economies are the
rather large public debt of Brazil and the issuance of external debt
in local currency in Australia.
Macroeconomic performance has also differed in the three countries.
Over the past ten years, Australia displayed fairly stable growth, low
inflation, and a sizeable current account deficit. Brazil experienced lower
growth, with significant volatility, declining inflation up to 1998, and
improving current account balances. Chile posted a strong growth
performance up to 1997, with declining inflation and a quite volatile
current account deficit.
The policy reactions at the different junctures are quite diverse. In
Australia in 1998 (and 2000), the real exchange rate depreciated,
inflation increased, and the current account deficit widened (in 1998),
with relatively stable growth of gross domestic product (GDP). In Chile
1. See the appendix for supplemental tables on the three countries’ inflation-
targeting regimes and economic indicators.
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in 1998, the real exchange rate did not move significantly, inflation
continued to decline, and the current account deficit, the investment
rate, and the growth rate all dropped considerably. In 2002, the Chilean
economy reacted similarly to what happened in Australia in the previous
episodes. Brazil in 2002 suffered a real exchange rate depreciation, an
increase in inflation, an important drop in the current account deficit,
and, in 2003, a GDP growth deceleration.
This paper assesses a number of issues across the country cases.
First, we analyze the extent to which policy responded in a
countercyclical fashion to the various shocks. In particular, did interest
rates rise or fall in reaction to the crisis, or, equivalently, was the
currency allowed to depreciate in response to negative external shocks?
Was fiscal policy changed in response to the crisis? Second, we examine
the factors that can constrain policymakers’ options, including initial
macroeconomic conditions (public debt, current account deficit, exchange
rate pass-through, initial inflation), previous institutional development
(openness, fiscal responsibility, financial deepening), the existence of a
framework, and the risk distribution between the private and public
sectors (balance sheet exposures), which leads to intertemporal
considerations. Third, we assess the trade-off between flexibility and
credibility, stressing the importance of building credibility in the
reaction to shocks. How much flexibility is appropriate? Did the response
stay within the established framework? Were the goals short term or
medium term? Finally, we classify the type of intervention policy
pursued in the three countries.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 1 describes the Australian
case; section 2 reviews the Brazilian experience; and section 3 assesses
the Chilean episodes of 1998 and 2002. Finally, section 4 derives some
policy lessons.
1. AUSTRALIA: POLICY RESPONSE TO EXTERNAL SHOCKS
Australia operates a flexible inflation-targeting regime with the
objective of ensuring that consumer price index (CPI) inflation
averages between two and three percent over the business cycle.
This regime was put in place informally in 1993 and was formalized
in 1996 with the release of a joint statement on the conduct of
monetary policy by the Governor of the Reserve Bank of Australia
and the Australian Treasurer.
The adoption of this regime followed two decades of poor inflation
performance, with CPI inflation averaging around 10 percent in the
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1970s and 8 percent in the 1980s. Its adoption, however, was not part
of a strategy to reduce inflation, since inflation had already fallen to
around 2 percent in 1993, largely as the result of a severe recession (see
figure 1, panel B). Rather, the inflation target was seen as a way of
ensuring that the hard-won reduction in inflation was sustained.2
From the outset, Australia’s inflation targeting framework has
been more flexible than those of some other countries; it has never
specified an explicit annual target or incorporated formal sanctions
on the Reserve Bank of Australia or Governor for missing the target.
In the initial years, some observers saw this as a lack of commitment
to the regime, although more recently, a number of countries have
implemented similar frameworks. The adoption of a flexible, as
opposed to a strict, inflation target largely reflected the recognition
that while monetary policy’s primary focus is medium-term price
stability, it should also take into account the trade-off between
inflation and output variability. This flexibility can be useful for
responding to supply shocks, movements in the exchange rate, and
developments in asset markets.
At the operational level, monetary policy is set in terms of a target
for the rate at which banks lend to one another in the overnight money
market (the so-called cash rate). Most bank loans to the business and
household sectors have variable interest rates, and these variable rates
move closely with the target cash rate. The Reserve Bank of Australia
influences the cash rate through its daily open market operations, which
affect the supply of balances that financial institutions maintain at the
Reserve Bank of Australia to settle interbank obligations. The actual
cash rate is typically within one basis point of the target. Australia
does not have any reserve requirements.
The monetary framework operates within the context of a floating
exchange rate and free movement of capital. The Australian dollar
was floated and capital flows were liberalized in late 1983, almost a
decade before the adoption of an inflation target. In the three years
after the float, the Australian dollar depreciated by over 30 percent
in trade-weighted terms, but thereafter it broadly cycled around a
relatively flat trend. The period was characterized by three major
cycles, with the exchange rate against the U.S. dollar troughing as
low as US$0.48 and peaking as high as US$0.87. These cycles largely,
though not exclusively, reflected movements in commodity prices
2. For a review of Australia’s experience with inflation targeting, see Stevens
(1999, 2003).
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A. Real GDP B. Weighted median CPI
(year-end percentage change) (year-end percentage change)
C. Exchange rates D. Terms of trade
(1989 = 100) (1989 = 100)
E. Current account F. Target cash rate
(percent of GDP) (percent)
Sources: Australian Bureau of Statistics and Reserve Bank of Australia.
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and, hence, Australia’s terms of trade (figure 2). The main exception
to this was in 2000–02, when the currency was unusually weak given
movements in the terms of trade (see below).
Figure 2. Australia: Real Exchange Rate and Terms of Trade
Sources: Australian Bureau of Statistics and Reserve Bank of Australia.
Notwithstanding the generally stabilizing role played by the
exchange rate, the Reserve Bank of Australia has on occasion intervened
heavily in the foreign exchange market. Such intervention is, however,
relatively rare and is undertaken in response to movements in the
exchange rate that seem excessive relative to changes in economic or
financial conditions. As such, this type of intervention typically takes
place only after the exchange rate has already appreciated or depreciated
significantly, and it is often intended to restore a sense of two-way price
risk, thereby lessening momentum which might otherwise lead to
further overshooting. Intervention is not used to pursue a particular
level of the exchange rate.
Since 1990, Australian GDP has grown at an average annual rate
of 3.25 percent (figure 1, panel A). The economy experienced a severe
recession in the early 1990s, largely as a result of the unwinding of the
credit and commercial property boom of the late 1980s, as well as the
recession in the United States. Since 1992, the economy has experienced
thirteen years of consecutive expansion with growth averaging almost
4 percent. The low point in growth over this period was in the year
from June 2000 to June 2001, when GPD expanded by just 1.50 percent.
This outcome largely reflected an exceptionally large decline in housing
investment associated with the transitional effects of introducing a
revised indirect tax (the Goods and Services Tax).
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The overall strong growth performance of the Australian economy
has been achieved despite two significant adverse external shocks—the
Asian/Russian financial crises of 1997–98 and the the U.S. recession in
2001. In previous decades, these shocks might have caused significant
disruptions to the Australian economy. That they did not is attributable
to a range of factors, not least of which is the flexibility of the Australian
dollar. These factors are discussed in detail below.3
1.1 The Asian and Russian Crises
In 1998 and 1999 Australia recorded average growth of nearly 5
percent—higher than the average of the past decade—despite the
financial and economic turmoil in some of its largest trading partners.
While external demand and Australia’s terms of trade clearly weakened
over this period, the effect on growth was more than offset by strong
domestic demand. Reflecting this, the current account deficit doubled
from around 3 percent of GDP prior to the crisis to a peak of around 6
percent in 1999 (see figure 1, panel C).
Given the close trading links between Australia and Asia, the
Australian dollar depreciated significantly in response to the turmoil.
Against the U.S. dollar, the currency depreciated by almost 20 percent
between mid-1997 and late 1998, while in trade-weighted terms the fall
was only 6 percent given the sharp appreciation of the Australian dollar
against the devalued Asian currencies. Largely in response to the
depreciation, underlying inflation rose from around 1.5. percent prior
to the crisis to around 2.5. percent in late 1999. This increase was
considerably less than would have been expected based on the historical
relation between inflation and the exchange rate (see below).
Throughout the crisis period, monetary policy remained
expansionary. At the time of the Thai devaluation, the target cash rate
stood at 5 percent, which was two percentage points below its level a
year earlier (figure 1, panel F). The target rate remained unchanged
until late 1998, when it was reduced to 4.75 percent. The decision to
maintain expansionary policy through this period distinguishes the
Australian experience from that of some other countries and reflects
three key factors: the cyclical starting point was advantageous; foreign
exchange risks were well managed; and markets retained confidence
in the macroeconomic and structural policy settings in Australia. We
discuss each of these factors in turn.
3. See also Macfarlane (2001).
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Advantageous cyclical starting point
At the time of the Asian crisis, the Australian economy was growing
strongly, and the underlying inflation rate was a full percentage point
below the medium-term target. This meant that the immediate
inflationary consequences of the depreciation were of less concern than
might have been the case had inflation been above the medium-term
target when the crisis hit.
Foreign exchange risk management
The depreciation of the exchange rate was unambiguously
expansionary, as has been the case in other countries with well-developed
financial markets. In particular, the depreciation was not associated
with an increase in Australia’s country risk premium, and it did not
lead to concerns about the balance sheet effects of currency mismatches
of either the banking or corporate sectors. This was despite the fact
that at the time of the crisis, Australia’s net foreign debt was equivalent
to around 42 percent of GDP, with the net debt of financial intermediaries
accounting for around 60 percent of this total. While much of the banks’
overseas liabilities were (and still are) in the form of foreign currency
bonds, the banks maintained very little currency risk on their own
balance sheets owing to the extensive use of foreign currency derivatives.
In 2001, for example, the banking sector had outstanding foreign
currency debt amounting to A$117 billion, offset by a net long position
in derivatives of A$109 billion. The sector’s main foreign exchange
exposure results from its equity investment of offshore operations, which
are intentionally left unhedged.4
The derivative contracts used to hedge the currency exposure were
undertaken mainly with nonresidents. Some of these entities had
borrowed Australian dollars and were seeking to swap their liability
back into their own currency, while others were investors who were
looking for exposure to the Australian dollar. The derivatives market
on which the Australian banks so heavily rely has developed over many
years, and it reflects both the liquidity in the Australian dollar spot
market and, more fundamentally, a willingness of foreign investors to
take on Australian dollar risk. This willingness is partly an outcome of
Australia’s relatively stable macroeconomic and financial framework.
4. For more detail, see Reserve Bank of Australia (2002). See also Caballero,
Cowan, and Kearns (2004).
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Market confidence
At the time of the Asian crisis, fiscal policy had moved into surplus
and the level of government debt to GDP was low by international
standards. Australia’s banking system and financial infrastructure were
both widely recognized as being in sound shape. Moreover, the expectation
of low inflation had become reasonably well embedded, as had the view
that a decade or more of structural reform had delivered a substantial
pickup in the underlying rate of productivity growth in Australia. Together,
these factors meant that international investors were prepared to fund a
significant increase in the current account deficit, albeit at a much lower
exchange rate. They also meant that the market was reasonably confident
that the temporary pickup in inflation associated with the depreciation
would not translate into a troublesome pickup in inflation expectations.
The policy response of maintaining expansionary monetary policy
and allowing the currency to depreciate was clearly successful. There
were, nonetheless, some difficult moments.5 In June 1998, large
international fund managers and exporters—who would normally have
been natural buyers of Australian dollars—undertook extensive
speculative selling of Australian dollars. This speculation occurred after
the exchange rate had already depreciated significantly, and it caused
the Australian dollar to fall US$0.04 in a few days. This drop led
financial markets to quickly price in a 75 basis point increase in interest
rates over the next few months (figure 3).
Figure 3. Australia: Exchange Rate and Interest Rates, 1998
Sources: Australian Bureau of Statistics and Reserve Bank of Australia.
5. The following discussion on intervention draws heavily on the Reserve
Bank of Australia’s Annual Reports for 1997–98 and 1998–99.
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In contrast to this market expectation, the Reserve Bank of Australia
did not increase interest rates and instead undertook a heavy round of
foreign exchange intervention, purchasing around A$2.6 billion in the
spot market in June. At the time, the Reserve Bank judged that higher
interest rates were not justified on general economic grounds, and that
the highly uncertain environment created a substantial risk that the
short-run dynamics would cause the exchange rate to move by more
than could be reasonably justified by the changed fundamentals. Given
this assessment, the authorities considered intervention in the foreign
exchange market to be the most appropriate response. The approach
was largely successful. Two-way price risk was reintroduced into the
market, and the exchange rate appreciated by around US$0.02 in the
second half of June. As market expectations of a tightening of monetary
policy gradually waned, the short-term yield curve became broadly flat
again by end July.
A second difficult period occurred following the Russian crisis in
late August. Again, the exchange rate came under significant downward
pressure, and short-term market interest rates increased. As in June,
the Reserve Bank of Australia intervened to support the Australian
dollar, although instead of relying solely on outright purchases of
Australian dollars (as it had done in the past), it also purchased call
options on the currency. This permitted the Reserve Bank to stimulate
a significant demand for Australian dollars—triggered initially by the
dealers who had sold the options—for a limited outlay. The sharp fall
in the exchange rate was reversed. The options, which were then in
profit, were resold. Conditions in the foreign exchange market stabilized
over the following months, and the Reserve Bank cut the target cash
rate by 25 basis points in December.
1.2 The U.S. Recession
The second major external shock was the U.S. recession in 2001.
The macroeconomic performance of Australia and the United States
was very similar in terms of output and inflation in the 1990s. However,
while Australian growth slowed in response to the U.S. recession, the
economy was able to considerably outperform the global economy. As in
the case of the Asian crisis, weak world demand was counterbalanced
by strong domestic demand, resulting in the current account deficit
again increasing to around 6 percent of GDP. Unlike the Asian crisis,
the exchange rate appreciated slightly, albeit from a very low level,
and the terms of trade experienced a modest increase, partly as a result
of the falling world price of manufactures.
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The solid performance of the Australian economy despite the difficult
international environment can be explained by a number of factors.
First, Australia avoided the worst of the stock market and investment
excesses associated with high-tech sector, and it was thus spared the
worst of the fallout. This reflects, in part, the absence of a large
information technology production sector in Australia.
Second, the level of the exchange rate in 2000–02 was very
expansionary. In 2000 and early 2001, the Australian dollar
depreciated by around 25 percent against the U.S. dollar to a record
low. For the three-year period from 2000 to 2002 as a whole, the real
value of the Australian dollar against the U.S. dollar was 23 percent
below its average level since the float. This weakness in the currency
was unexpected, particularly given the increase in Australia’s terms
of trade during this period.6 Indeed, it was the first time since the
float that the exchange rate had depreciated considerably when the
terms of trade were rising. This outcome reflected the view among
certain investors that Australia was an “old economy” with only a
small information technology sector. The level of capital inflow
declined, and correspondingly the current account deficit narrowed
to just below 2 percent of GDP in early 2001, its lowest level in
twenty-two years. As noted above, the deficit subsequently widened
to around 6 percent of GDP, as Australian assets once again became
more attractive given the relatively strong performance of the
Australian economy.
Third, Australian households have long been prepared to borrow
heavily, mainly for housing. This borrowing underpinned a strong
construction sector and pushed up house prices, generating a positive
wealth effect for existing homeowners.
In terms of policy, an interesting aspect of this period is the
monetary policy response to the large swings in the exchange rate.
Between November 1999 and August 2000, when the Australian
dollar was depreciating, the Reserve Bank of Australia increased
the target cash rate by 2 percentage points. This increase was
designed to withdraw the monetary stimulus that had been in place
during the Asian crisis. The weak exchange rate was not a primary
reason for tightening policy, although it did suggest that the stimulus
was no longer required.
6. For a full discussion of exchange rate movements around this time, see
Macfarlane (2000).
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The exchange rate continued to depreciate through 2000 and into
2001, reaching a record low of US$0.4775 in April 2001. At the same
time, the deterioration in the international economy undermined the
case for tighter policy on general macroeconomic grounds. The Reserve
Bank therefore undertook a round of foreign exchange intervention, as
in 1998. Total intervention between September 2000 and April 2001
amounted to around $2.5 billion (around the same as in June 1998) and
was conducted through both purchases of call options on the Australian
dollar and outright purchases of Australian dollars. In contrast to the
earlier episode, the intervention was spread out over a longer period,
and market interest rates did not spike when the Australian dollar was
depreciating sharply (see figure 4).
Figure 4. Australia: Exchange Rate and Interest Rates, 2000
and 2001
Sources: Australian Bureau of Statistics and Reserve Bank of Australia.
The fall in the exchange rate in 2000 led to a rise in forecast inflation.
In late 2000, for example, the Reserve Bank of Australia was expecting
inflation to increase to around 3 percent over the next year or so. The
authorities did not tighten monetary tightening further, however, as
the increase was largely seen as temporary given the deterioration in
the world economy and the apparently well-anchored inflation
expectations. As was the case with the 1997–98 depreciation, the pass-
through into domestic prices was relatively muted. This reflects a
number of factors, including well-anchored inflation expectations, the
ability of businesses to hedge currency risk, and the unwillingness of
firms to increase prices in a low-inflation world, particularly when the
exchange rate is viewed as having a large cyclical element.
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2. BRAZIL: POLICY RESPONSE TO EXTERNAL SHOCKS
Brazil had no lack of shocks and crises over the last ten years. The
Mexican crisis hit Brazil shortly after the Real Plan successfully
stabilized the currency after years of hyperinflation, and it was followed
by the Asian crisis, the Russian crisis, the 1999 floating of the real, the
Argentine crisis, and, finally, the power and election crises. In all of
these occasions, Brazil’s financial and real variables suffered (see the
Brazilian spread over U.S. Treasury bonds in figure 5).
Figure 5. Brazil: EMBI Sovereign Spread
Sources: J.P.Morgan and authors’ calculations.
Over time, Brazil developed a set of reactions and policies to withstand
large shocks, such as the appropriate timing of intervention to allow
further depreciation or to tap the resources of the International Monetary
Fund (IMF). Some policies developed into frameworks, as in the case of
the inflation-targeting regime and the way the Central Bank reacts to
shocks. Even the country’s relationship with the IMF during a crisis
provides lessons for other countries that may come to face similar events.
In the rest of this section, we introduce the current policy framework
as it has evolved since the Real Plan. We then describe the policy reaction
to the 2002 crisis, the role of the IMF, and the framework developed by
the Central Bank to deal with the increased volatility.7
7. We concentrate on the 2002 crisis and policy reactions. Most of the policy
reactions to previous shocks are embedded in the rules and frameworks developed
for this case.
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2.1 Policy Framework
In the 1980s and early 1990s, Brazil experienced chronic high
inflation despite a series of failed stabilization plans involving six
monetary reforms in ten years. Potential GDP growth was hampered,
and all sorts of distortions developed. Unlike other high inflation
countries in Latin America, the Brazilian economy was never dollarized.
Instead, indexation—the adaptive policy response—became pervasive
throughout the economy, and its capacity to accommodate inflation
may partially explain Brazil’s failure to engage in serious structural
change before 1994.
The Real Plan of July 1994 succeeded in reducing inflation through
an exchange-rate-based stabilization program that introduced a
transitory unit of reference for prices. In March 1994, nominal prices,
wages, and other contracts were allowed to be quoted in a unit of real
value (Unidade Real de Valor, or URV) that would be replaced by a
new currency, the real, in July 1994. The key issue was to coordinate a
deindexation process to break the inflationary inertia, since the
automatic price adjustments to past inflation were not synchronized.
The Central Bank fine-tuned the URV daily to reflect the currency’s
loss of purchasing power. In the interim period after the introduction of
the URV and before its replacement by the new currency, it was expected
that relative prices would converge to their equilibrium value. This
was important to the second phase of the conversion, when the URV
would be transformed into the real on a one-to-one basis. The plan caused
inflation to plunge from 46 percent in June 1994 to 1.5 percent in
September 1994, and it succeeded in keeping inflation low in subsequent
years. The use of the exchange rate as the main anchor for monetary
policy was not sustainable, however, since the currency remained
overvalued in real terms for several years.
Brazil adopted inflation targeting in early 1999, after floating its
currency and experiencing a 50 percent nominal depreciation. Inflation
targeting was one element of a wider policy regime that entailed the
announcement, a year earlier, of a sequence of increased primary
budget surpluses. The new monetary regime worked well: the initial
inflation targets were set at 8 percent for 1999 and 6 percent for 2000,
with a 2 percent tolerance range. In December 1999 the twelve-month
inflation rate was 8.9 percent; the following December it was 6 percent,
exactly on target.
This successful start was followed by two difficult years, in which
Brazil was hit by contagion from Argentina, a domestic energy crisis, a
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widening of bond spreads worldwide, a sudden reversal in capital flows
amounting to 6 percent of GDP, and the political uncertainty
surrounding the 2002 presidential campaign. During this period the
real depreciated again, by 20 percent in 2001 and 50 percent in 2002.
Inflation temporarily increased to as much as 16 percent, but it was
back to 6 percent by March 2004.
Despite the large shocks, private sector inflation expectations did not
depart significantly from the country’s inflation targets until September
2002. In 2003, after a quarter of high inflationary expectations, both
inflation and expectations converged back to the targets.
2.2 The 2002 Crisis
Brazil underwent a severe stress test in 2002, mainly as a result of
the uncertainties related to the presidential campaign, but also in
response to the widening of spreads worldwide, especially on U.S.
corporate bonds.8 The economy registered a sudden stop in capital flows
amounting to 6 percent of GDP, an exchange rate depreciation of almost
50 percent, and a substantial increase in the Brazilian bond spread
over U.S. Treasury bonds.9 The real depreciation and the sudden stop
in capital inflows required a sharp adjustment in the current account
(5 percent of GDP from 2001 to 2003) and a corresponding reduction in
domestic absorption, mostly private consumption and investment.
The sudden stop and the resulting depreciation also led to an increase
in the amount of public debt as a fraction of GDP, because of the composition
of Brazilian public debt. Both domestic and external public debt were linked
to the exchange rate: 30 percent of domestic debt was indexed to the nominal
exchange rate and, as in most emerging markets, all public external debt
is denominated in strong currencies. Consequently, the ratio of net public
debt to GDP jumped from 0.54 to 0.63 in a few months.
The composition of public debt in Brazil has been an important
issue for a while. The unwillingness of the private sector to bear
currency risk limits the government’s ability to reduce the dollar-linked
component of the debt. After two years of continuous reduction
(1999–2000), the proportion of dollar-linked debt increased again in
2001. Only since mid-2003 has the government been able to reduce
this component of the debt once again.
8. This section draws on Giavazzi, Goldfajn, and Herrera (2005).
9. The expression sudden stop reflects a rapid collapse in net capital inflows into
the country; it is defined and analysed in Dornbusch, Goldfajn, and Valdés (1995).
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Doubts regarding the sustainability of the debt mounted as public
debt increased, and investors became suspicious about the economic policies
that would be adopted after the election. At one point in mid-2002, the
market began to price into Brazilian bonds a risk of default within
the coming twelve months. The J.P. Morgan Emerging Market Bond
Index (EMBI) spread (the difference between the yield on dollar-
denominated bonds issued by Brazil and the yield on equivalent U.S.
Treasury bonds) moved from 700 basis points in March to 2,400 basis
points at the end of July.
The uncertainty regarding the sustainability of public debt
induced market participants to reduce their exposure to public debt
or seek shorter-term government securities. As a result, the discount
on long-term domestic government securities widened substantially,
and the debt maturity was shortened. The average maturity of
SELIC-indexed debt held by the market fell from thirty-six months
in March 2002 to twenty months in January 2003, and the percentage
of debt coming due in the following twelve months rose from 6 percent
to about 50 percent.10
The inflation targeting regime also underwent a direct stress
test. The exchange rate depreciation (and doubts regarding monetary
policy under the new government) led to a rise in expected inflation:
one-year-ahead inflation expectations increased from 4.5 percent in
March to 5.3 percent in early August and 10 percent in October.
2.3 Policy Reaction
The sudden stop raised a number of challenges for the government.
First, the government had to restore confidence on future policies to
10. The Special Settlement and Custody System (SELIC) overnight rate,
expressed in annual terms, is the average rate weighted by the volume of one-day
operations guaranteed by federal government securities, carried out at SELIC
through committed operations; it is the basic reference rate for monetary policy
(see the Central Bank of Brazil website, at www.bcb.gov.br/sddsi/txselic_i.htm).
Mutual funds, which held 30 percent of the domestic public debt, were particularly
vulnerable to the widening of the discount on longer-term securities. Since these
institutions were de facto issuing very liquid liabilities against long-term
government bonds, the losses on their assets induced heavy withdrawals from
depositors. Moreover, some funds were delaying the recognition of the losses on
their balance sheets, thereby increasing the risks of runs on their liabilities. To
avoid that, the Central Bank actively enforced the mark-to-market regulations,
leading in the short run to more recognized losses and withdrawals. Eventually,
and partially as a result of Central Bank intervention, the discounts stopped
widening, further losses were prevented, and withdrawals were cut short.
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avert the net capital outflows and reduce doubts regarding debt dynamics.
Second, the Central Bank had to evaluate whether the impact of the
exchange rate depreciation would be limited to a one-time change in
the price level, or whether inflation would remain high even after the
exchange rate had stabilized. In this regard, the Central Bank had to
determine how fast and by how much to raise interest rates. Third, the
government had to manage the sharp fall in the demand for long-term
government securities and avoid a roll-over crisis.
The depreciation had rapidly increased the ratio of public debt to
GDP. This called for an increase in the primary surplus if the level of
the debt were to remain stable at this new level; alternatively, the debt
level could fall as the result of a reversal of the exchange rate
depreciation. Market confidence in future fiscal policies was necessary,
but there was widespread uncertainty as to the policy that the future
government would adopt.
The situation called for a change in expectations regarding future
fiscal and monetary policy. The government faced serious issues,
however, of how to achieve a commitment on future fiscal policy from
the leading candidates in the midst of the campaign and how best to
conduct monetary policy act in the process. A first response came in
August, when the IMF granted Brazil a US$30 billion loan—the largest
ever in IMF history—conditional on Brazil maintaining “responsible
policies” over the next few years in terms of fiscal primary surpluses,
inflation targeting, a floating exchange regime, and respect of
contracts, including the public debt. The purpose of the loan was not
only to provide the Central Bank with foreign exchange reserves,
but also to provide a mechanism that would help the main candidates
coordinate their public support for sound policies. The candidates
came through with their statements, and while some were more
vague than had been hoped, they certainly helped avoid a further
deterioration of market conditions before the October elections. More
importantly, the leading candidate started sending stronger signals
that he was prepared to adopt the fiscal stance required to stabilize
debt dynamics.
At the same time, it became progressively clearer that the
exchange rate depreciation would have persistent effects on inflation.
(We explain in detail below how the Central Bank confronted the rise
in inflation.) Understanding the response of price setters to changes
in the exchange rate was crucial for determining the optimal monetary
policy response, since the larger and more persistent the effect on
prices, the longer is the horizon needed for inflation to return to the
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target path. The most recent experience prior to the crisis was that of
1999: after a 60 percent depreciation, inflation increased temporarily
to 9 percent, but at the end of 2000 it was back to 6.0 percent, the
mid-point of the central bank’s target range.
One big difference between 1999 and 2002, however, was the level
of the real exchange rate before the depreciation. To compare the
exchange rates, we use an indexed based on thirteen currencies and
normalized to 100 in 1994; a fall in the index indicates a real appreciation.
In 1999, before the devaluation, Brazil’s effective real exchange rate
based on this index was 95.7; in 2002, it was 150. As shown in Goldfajn
and Werlang (2000), the level of the real exchange rate before a
devaluation is an important factor in determining the pass-through
from the exchange rate to prices. When the real exchange rate is weak,
foreign exporters enjoy large margins and can afford to cut them to
preserve their market shares, thus dampening the pass-through. This
was the case in 1999, but not quite the situation in 2002.
At this point monetary policy reacted strongly. The SELIC rate
was raised from 18 to 21 percent on October 15 and then to 25 percent
in mid-December; the real rate jumped from 11 to 18 percent, consistent
with a monetary policy rule that responds more than proportionately to
an increase in inflation expectations. President Luiz Inacio Lula da
Silva eventually delivered on his promises: the new government
maintained the floating exchange regime and inflation targeting, made
clear that public debt would be honored, and increased the primary
surplus by half a percent of GDP. (The shift in perceived fiscal policy
was large; expectations were that primary surplus would actually fall
by a few percentage points.)
Central Bank framework for dealing with shocks
In early 2003 the Central Bank realized that it was not feasible
(under reasonable output loss estimations) to pursue the original
targets set a couple of years earlier.11 The depreciation, together with
doubts regarding monetary policy under the next government, caused
annualized inflation to reach 6 percent just in the last quarter of 2003
(30 percent annualized). Simulations based on a set of assumptions
indicated that a convergence trajectory that reached 6.5 percent in
2003 (the ceiling of the target tolerance interval) would have implied
11. This section draws on Fraga, Goldfajn, and Minella (2004).
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a 1–2 percent drop in GDP. A trajectory that reached the center of the
target (4 percent) in 2003 would have implied an even larger decline
in GDP (–7 percent).
The decision was therefore made to gear monetary policy toward
converging inflation to the original target tolerance interval in two years
rather than one (two years is no magic number; it all depends on the size
and type of the shock) and to pursue a trajectory compatible with end-of-
year adjusted targets of 8.5 percent in 2003 and 5.5 percent in 2004.
Of course, breaching original targets always carries credibility
costs. Given the size of the shocks, however, credibility losses could
also stem from a decision to keep the old target, because that might
be considered unattainable (and for all practical purposes, dropping
from an annualized rate of 30 percent to a 6 percent ceiling rate in
one year was not achievable). The decision to keep the original targets
must weigh these two effects. In the end, the Central Bank opted to
pursue the original targets over a longer horizon and to increase
communication (and transparency) to explain that this path offered
the best inflation/output trade-off.
We now turn to the Central Bank of Brazil’s methodology for
dealing with shocks. The methodology, which is built on the recent
experience with inflation targeting during turbulent times, calculates
the inflationary impact of current supply shocks as well as the
secondary impact of past shocks (due to inertia in the inflation process).
The idea is simply to accommodate the direct impact of current shocks
and to choose a horizon to weed out the secondary impact of past shocks.
Thus when facing shocks, the Central Bank of Brazil initially considers
the nature and persistence of the shock. It then builds different inflation
and output trajectories associated with different interest rate paths.
Based on its aversion to inflation variability, it chooses the optimal
path for output and inflation. The Central Bank of Brazil (2003) has
published this path and also the outcome of different paths. This is in
line with Svensson’s (2002) recommendations.12
If shocks are large or persistent (or both), their inflationary effects
may last one year or more. The optimal inflation path may imply a
twelve-month-ahead inflation level that is higher than the previous
annual target. In this situation, the Central Bank of Brazil would not
be targeting the previous inflation target, so it uses an adjusted target
that takes into account the primary effects of changes in relative prices
12. Svensson’s (2002) recommendations also involve publishing the
corresponding instrument-rate plan.
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and of any past inertia that must be accommodated. The adjusted target
thus starts with the target previously set by the government and adds
the primary effect of the shock on regulated-price inflation and the
inflation inertia inherited from the previous year that is to be
accommodated in the current year. The new target is publicly
announced. When the economy is facing cost shocks, such as the
increase of regulated prices above the inflation of the other prices of the
economy, monetary policy should be calibrated to accommodate the direct
impact of shocks on the price level, but to fight their secondary effects.
Furthermore, since the Central Bank also takes into account output
costs, the inertial impacts of the previous year’s inflation should not
necessarily be fought completely.
Changes in relative prices, such as the prices of regulated utilities
and the exchange rate, have been one of the main challenges faced by
the Central Bank of Brazil. Since the implementation of the Real Plan
in July 1994, regulated-price inflation has been well above the market-
price inflation, for a variety of reasons. The ratio of regulated prices to
market prices rose 31.4 percent between the start of the inflation
targeting period (July 1999) and February 2003. As long as there is
some downward rigidity in prices, changes in relative prices are usually
translated into higher inflation. If these increases are treated as a supply
shock, monetary policy should be oriented toward eliminating only their
secondary impact on inflation, while preserving the initial realignment
of relative prices. The Central Bank’s effort to quantify the first-order
inflationary impact of regulated-price inflation has therefore become
particularly important, since it helps to implement monetary policy
flexibly and without losing sight of the larger objective of achieving the
inflation targets.13
This methodology was applied to the Brazilian case after the 2002
crisis, for inflation in 2003 and 2004.14 In an open letter to the Minister
of Finance in January 200315, the bank explained why the exchange rate
13. The first-order effect on market prices (in contrast to regulated prices)
are not calculated. The methodology assumes that the primary shock to market
prices tends to occur fastest within the first quarter after the shock. The full
primary shock to market prices is thus assumed to have already occurred when
the adjusted targets are calculated.
14. See Central Bank of Brazil (2003). For a more detailed explanation of the
methodology, see Freitas, Minella, and Riella (2002).
15. Under the presidential decree that introduced inflation targeting, the
Central Bank of Brazil is required to submit an open letter to the Ministry of
Finance explaining the causes of any breach of the inflation target and the steps
to taken to get the inflation rate back down.
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had overshot and made explicit estimates of the size of the shocks and
their persistence. It estimated the shock from administered prices to be
1.7 percent and the inertia from past shocks to be 4.2 percent, of which
two thirds was to be accepted, resulting in a further adjustment of 2.8
percent. The Central Bank added these two numbers to the previously
announced target of 4.0 percent to get an adjusted inflation target for
2003 of 8.5 percent that is, 4.0 percent plus 1.7 percent plus 2.8 percent).
The letter indicated that an attempt to achieve an inflation rate of 6.5
percent in 2003 would entail a fall of 1.6 percent in GDP, whereas trying
to achieve the nonadjusted target of 4.0 percent would lead to a decline in
GDP of 7.3 percent. Ultimately, inflation in 2003 ended up at 9.3 percent,
very close to the adjusted target, and GDP declined by 0.2 percent.
In the inflation targeting design, a core inflation measure or the
establishment of escape clauses have also been used or suggested as a
way of dealing with shocks and volatilities. The main argument against
the use of core inflation is that it is not fully representative of the loss
of the purchasing power of money, at a given point in time. Agents are
concerned about the whole consumption basket. In the Brazilian case,
excluding the regulated price items would imply leaving out more than
30 percent of the representative consumption basket. Private agents
may therefore question a monetary policy that is not concerned about
the overall consumer price index.
In general, the adjusted target has two advantages. First, the core
inflation measure is not necessarily isolated from the effect of shocks.
For example, the large depreciation shock of the Brazilian economy in
2002 raised core inflation way above the inflation target. Second, the
construction of the adjusted target is directly based on the idea that
monetary policy should neutralize second-order effects of supply shocks
and accommodate the first-round effects, and on the fact that some
weight to output volatility should be assigned in the objective function.
Therefore, some principles under which monetary policy is conducted
become more transparent.
In the case of escape clauses, the circumstances under which the
Central Bank can justify the nonfulfillment of the targets are set in
advance. It has more similarities with the adjusted target procedure
than with the use of core inflation as it does not exclude items from the
inflation target, but defines circumstances in which the breach of targets
can be justified. The main advantages of the adjusted target procedure
are threefold: it is a forward-looking procedure; it clearly defines the
new target to be pursued by the Central Bank; and it explains how the
new target is measured.
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The role of the IMF
The IMF played an important role in the crisis management. IMF
skepticism regarding the success of the Real Plan in 1994 led to a lack
of effective dialogue between the institution and the Brazilian authorities.
In 1994–97, effective dialogue was not vital: inflation stabilization was
a success, capital flows were abundant, and the Brazilian risk premium
reached record low levels. Brazil was not engaged in a program with
the IMF, as it was not needed.
The Fund’s surveillance could have had a role in advising Brazilian
authorities of the need for fiscal and external adjustment early in the
process. In fact, surveillance papers often mentioned the need for further
fiscal consolidation (although they did not take a strong position on the
exchange rate regime).16 However, the IMF’s comments during this
period lacked the necessary emphasis and had little impact on Brazilian
economics and politics. The explanation resides in both the lack of
effective dialogue between the IMF and the Brazilian government and
the fact that market conditions remained favorable during this period.
The turbulence in international markets after the Asian crisis and,
in particular, the Russian crisis triggered the need for a formal IMF
program and financial assistance to Brazil in 1998. The program was
centered on the fiscal adjustment, but it maintained support for the
exchange rate regime. Despite progress on the fiscal accounts, market
forces obligated Brazil to change its exchange regime, and the program
was revised in March 1999.
The IMF’s most interesting role came during the 2002 crisis. The
market turbulence had an important political component, but IMF
officials were not directly involved in talks with politicians. Both the
Cardoso administration and the IMF understood that it would not be
beneficial for all parties involved if an international organization was
seen to be engaged in the political process. The reforms and economic
adjustments were exclusively in the interest of the Brazilian people,
and that is how they were to be seen. The Brazilian government had
always expressed strong ownership of the reforms and adjustments;
this was an important message to transmit to the future government.
Although the IMF would not engage in political negotiations, it was
essential for Brazil and the future IMF program that the candidates
agree on basic principles. It clearly was not feasible to engage the
16. See IMF, Independent Evaluation Office, “The IMF and Recent Capital
Account Crises: Indonesia, Korea and Brazil,” 2003.
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candidates in detailed negotiations of a program with the IMF. The
outgoing administration had to negotiate with the IMF in broad terms
and then present the agreement to the candidates in the hope that they
would publicly indicate their support. This strategy would only be feasible
if the IMF program did not contain detailed conditionalities to be fulfilled
by the future government. This required a delicate balance, since a
coherent economic program usually involves future commitments. The
outgoing administration was very firm, however, in not imposing either
abundant or stringent conditionalities on the future government. The
diagnosis by both the IMF and the government was that the solution to
the uncertainties regarding the future of Brazil relied not on establishing
further measures, but rather on guaranteeing that current policies would
be followed in the future. The most important example is the target for
the primary surplus. Both IMF staff members and some economists in
the government believed that raising the primary surplus could provide
a cushion for unforeseen events that could affect debt dynamics.
Nevertheless, the most senior officials in the government and at the IMF
rightly agreed and emphasized that the overwhelming priority was to
devise a program that obtained support from all parties involved with
regard to fiscal and monetary responsibility and respect of contracts.
2.4 Results
Far from falling into a vicious circle, the economy rapidly stabilized.
The EMBI spread fell to 1,500 basis points by the end of December
2002: a year later, when Brazil’s rating was raised from B to B+, the
spread fell to 450 basis points—100 points less than in February 2002,
before the crisis had started. As had happened on the way up, part of
this reduction is explained by the simultaneous reduction in the U.S.
corporate bond spread, which fell 200 basis points between October 2002
and December 2003, but there is little doubt that markets’ perceptions
of Brazil had shifted. The exchange rate stabilized and inflation
expectations, which had been rising for six month, were back to 5.8
percent by December 2003. Eventually, the Central Bank could lower
rates: by late 2003 the SELIC rate was reduced to 16.5, two points
below its level before the crisis started.
Nevertheless, the 2002 shock had severe real consequences.
Higher inflation and tight monetary policy in 2003 led to lower wages,
reduced consumption, and zero (–0.2 percent) growth, driven by an
export boom. In 2004, the economy showed signs of substantial recovery
of wages, consumption, and output, and inflation was within the targets.
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3. CHILE: POLICY RESPONSE TO EXTERNAL SHOCKS
During the period 1990–2003, the Chilean economy grew at an
average rate of 5.5 percent per year. The inflation rate fell from levels
close to 30 percent in the beginning of the 1990s to single-digit levels
by the end of 1994; thereafter it fluctuated around a steady-state level
of 3 percent. External conditions played an important role in shaping
the Chilean business cycle during this period. The terms of trade
exhibited significant fluctuations, which were mainly determined by
the evolution of the price of copper (the economy’s main export) and
oil prices. Additionally, the Chilean economy regained access to
international capital markets during this period. Net private capital
flows more than doubled between the late 1980s and mid-1990s. This
access to external financing allowed an important boom in investment,
which averaged 28 percent of GDP in the period 1995–98 (see table 1,
as well as table A5 in the appendix).
Figures 6 and 7 show the relation between an index of external
conditions (ECI) and GDP growth and the output gap, respectively.17
The figures show a strong correlation between the ECI and the
different measures of activity. Using the output gap measure, we
distinguish one contractionary phase and one expansionary phase
during the period 1990–2003. For the years 1990–98, the economy
grew above potential, while in 1998–2003, the economy operated below
potential. External conditions were particularly favorable in 1989,
1992, and 1995–1996. Nevertheless, a single external shock can be
used to divide the whole period in these two clearly different phases:
the Asian crisis and the associated events (see table 2). After a short
period of improved conditions in 2000–01, another important external
shock hit the Chilean economy when the major industrialized
economies experienced a contraction in output in 2001–02, following
the end of the asset price bubble in the United States and the terrorist
attacks of September 11. Argentina and Brazil also underwent
increasing pressure during this period, culminating in the collapse
of the currency board in the former country, debt sustainability
17. The index of external conditions is constructed as a weighted average of
the change in world interest rates, the change in terms of trade, and the GDP
growth of commercial partners. The weights come from a regression among GDP
growth, these variables, and other relevant variables to explain GDP growth. A
panel of economists set up by the Ministry of Finance computes this output gap
measure, which is used to estimate the structural fiscal surplus (see Marcel and
others, 2001).
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problems in the latter, and pressure on other emerging markets. In
this section we study in detail the effects of these two shocks on the
Chilean economy and the policy responses implemented in each case.
Since the policy framework differed in both episodes, we describe the
main components of the monetary policy framework at the time of
each shock before analyzing the shock itself.
Figure 6. Chile: External Conditions Index and GDP Growth
Sources: Central Bank of Chile and authors’ calculations.
Figure 7. Chile: External Conditions Index and Output Gap
Sources: Central Bank of Chile, Ministry of Finance of Chile, and authors’ calculations.
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Table 2. Main External Events, 1997–2002
Country Event Date
Thailand Crisis and devaluation July 1997
Russia Devaluation and default July 1998
Brazil Speculative attack and devaluation January 1999
United States Technology stocks bubble burst March 2000
Turkey Speculative attack and devaluation January 2001
Argentina Political turmoil, speculative attack, February 2001
and debt sustainability problems
United States Terrorist attacks September 2001
United States Accounting scandals December 2001
Argentina Devaluation and default December 2001
Brazil Elections May–October 2002
Source: Massad (2003b).
3.1 The Policy Framework in 1990–99
After being granted independence in 1989, the Central Bank of
Chile, aiming at fulfilling its objective of price stability, pursued a
quasi inflation-targeting regime until 1999. It moved into a full-fledged
inflation-targeting regime in 2000. Inflation reached 27.3 percent in
December of 1990, after major fluctuations in previous years. Probably
the most basic components of the macroeconomic framework included
annual quantitative inflation targets and the predominance of these
targets as the nominal anchor of the economy, which eventually came
into conflict with other nominal commitments. The announcement of
these targets was probably the most symbolic characteristic of the
regime, and it has led some authors to consider the Chilean experience
of the 1990s as an inflation-targeting regime. Other typical features
of this regime were absent, however. For instance, both the
transparency and the communication devices of the regime fell short
of what is regarded today as a prerequisite of inflation targeting (see
table A1 in the appendix).
Annual targets for the December-December inflation rate for the
coming year were announced in September of each year, in the Central
Bank’s annual report to Congress. This report strategically appears
just one month before Congress begins debating next year’s fiscal
budget. In designing the inflationary objectives, the Central Bank
first considered the goal of converging to single-digit inflation and,
once that was accomplished, the final goal of achieving the level of
inflation of developed countries—a level that was not precisely defined.
The process explicitly included a slow convergence to lower inflation
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because of the prevalence of widespread backward-looking indexation
in the Chilean economy. A rapid convergence to a low-inflation regime
was considered risky because the key price misalignment that was
likely to result would both produce real negative effects and jeopardize
the disinflation program’s sustainability. Only once in the eleven-
year period was this annual announcement overridden during the
course of the year: in 1995 the target was modified from 9 percent to
8 percent, in a policy decision closely related to the opportunistic
approach to disinflation (see Dornbusch and Fischer, 1993). The initial
inflation targets were defined as a target range, whereas point targets
were used after 1995 (see figure 8).
Figure 8. Chile: Actual and Targeted Inflation
Source: Central Bank of Chile.
Given the date of the announcement and its focus on December of
the coming year, the average life of the target in the 1990s was only
seven and a half months—hardly a time span for monetary policy to
have strong effects through the conventional transmission mechanisms.
Rather, the announcements were a compromise between inflation
forecasts, the need to lower inflation, and a well-developed communication
strategy. The Central Bank was remarkably successful in bringing
inflation down from 30 percent to less than 5 percent with this strategy.
There is no consensus on the precise reasons for this outcome. De
Gregorio (2003) and García (2003) identify the positive productivity
shocks faced by the economy throughout the 1990s as a key driving
force of the inflation dynamics. Unit labor costs decreased despite
indexation and declining inflation thanks to the unexpectedly high
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growth performance. Corbo (1998), Morandé (2001), and Schmidt-Hebbel
and Werner (2002) identify the existence of the inflation target as a key
coordinating device for expectations. They show that inflation dynamics
changed substantially in the 1990s.
In addition to these annual inflation targets, the Central Bank
managed a target band for the exchange rate. The band was perceived
as the key instrument for achieving the objective of normal functioning
of the external payments system, which in turn was implemented as
a target (a cap) for the current account deficit. The exchange rate
band was based on a purchasing power parity rule, corrected in some
periods for productivity differentials between Chile and its trading
partners. It underwent a number of modifications over the 1990s,
including changes in its width and once-and-for-all realignments. The
Central Bank intervened not only at the edges of the band, but also
actively within it.
The Central Bank maintained important regulations on the capital
account in the 1990s, including a nonremunerated reserve requirement
for capital inflows (which was increasingly broadened until 1997) and a
minimum stay for some inflows. These regulations were based on the
desire to retain the possibility of managing the exchange rate with
monetary policy autonomy and the intent to manage inflows to keep
total expenditures under control.
The Central Bank’s monetary policy conduct improved
progressively throughout the 1990s. From a rather rough management
of interest rates on a range of instruments in 1990, the Central Bank
converged to managing liquidity to achieve a certain overnight interest
rate in the interbank market. Foreign exchange interventions, in turn,
were implemented in different ways, directly through foreign exchange
purchases from public enterprises (mainly Codelco, the state-owned
copper company) and indirectly through market operations. The
publicly available information did not specifically indicate the exact
extent and timing of interventions, as it jointly reported interventions
and other international reserve movements—although interventions
were clearly aimed at hindering the strong trend toward real exchange
rate appreciation. The effort to sterilize inflows between 1990 and
1997 was a large one: during that period the Central Bank increased
its foreign exchange reserve holdings from US$2.5 billion to US$17.8
billion. Its foreign exchange position switched from 5.1 percent of GDP
short to around 25 percent of GDP long. In 1998 the Central Bank
also intervened in the foreign exchange market by issuing dollar-linked
debt and, briefly, using options.
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Fiscal policy was managed in an orderly fashion in the 1990s,
which allowed the central government’s net public debt to decline from
37.6 percent of GDP in 1989 to 5.6 percent in 1997. The strong growth
performance facilitated this result, but institutional factors also
contributed. In fact, despite not having an explicit fiscal rule, Chile
has strong fiscal institutions, including a centralized state (not a federal
state), a strong Ministry of Finance within the government, and
arrangements such as a copper stabilization fund that allows the
authority to set aside abnormally high copper revenues in a
transparent way.
In addition to strong monetary and fiscal policies, the Chilean economy
also displays strong financial institutions. The debt crisis in the 1980s,
which led to the collapse of the banking system, triggered a substantial
improvement in financial regulation and supervision. These changes
supported the development of a healthy and resilient financial system.
3.2 The Asian and Russian Crises
By the beginning of 1997, the Chilean economy was experiencing
an unprecedented growth phase. The economy grew at an average
rate of 8.5 percent in 1991–96. Moreover, this rapid growth was
achieved with inflation falling from 27 percent at the end of 1990 to
6.6 percent in December of 1996. In July 1997, Thailand devalued
the baht; this event marked the beginning of the Asian crisis. In the
months following this devaluation, many other countries in East
Asia were forced to depreciate their currencies. Massive capital
outflows, severe output losses, and widespread bankruptcy of banks
and nonfinancial firms followed. The negative effects of these events
were not restricted to Asian economies, but troubled many other
emerging economies, as well.
Initially, the Asian crisis was expected to have an effect on the
Chilean economy through real links, as close to 35 percent of Chilean
exports were directed to these countries. These real effects were
perceived to be limited, however. By December of 1997, GDP growth
forecasts reported by consensus forecasts for 1998 were around 6.4
percent, only 0.3 percent down from those forecasts made in August
1997 (see figure 9). However, as the crisis developed, it became clear
that its effects on the Chilean economy were not limited to real links,
but also involved financial effects. Access to international capital
markets for emerging economies, which was extensive for most of
these countries in previous years, was severely restricted.
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Figure 9. Chile: Actual and Forecast GDP Growth
Sources: Central Bank of Chile and Consensus Forecast.
After suffering a fall of more than 13 percent in 1996, the terms of
trade for the Chilean economy rebounded considerably in the first half of
1997, growing 5 percent in the first half of 1997 relative to the 1996 level,
led mainly by the increase in the price of copper. However, the slowdown
in world activity stemming from the Asian crisis generated a large fall in
commodities prices in the second half of 1997. The price of copper fell more
than 35 percent between July 1997 and June 1998. The fall in terms of
trade was less dramatic, however, since the prices of the main Chilean
imports were also falling. Between the second quarter of 1997 and the
second quarter of 1998, the terms of trade fell nearly 3.5 percent.
Alternative measures of the terms of trade indicate that the fall
may have been much larger than what the national account figures
suggest. A methodology developed by Bennett and Valdés (2001) indicates
that the terms of trade fell 15 percent from July 1997 to June 1998 (see
figure 10).18 Another measure that can be used to quantify the magnitude
of the external shock faced by the economy is a weighted average of the
changes in the terms of trade, the world real interest rate, and trade
partners’ growth (ECI). This index reached its highest value for the
1990s in 1995; it then decreased, and after 1998 it stayed below its
average for the period 1985–2003.
18. These authors construct monthly price series for exports and imports
using a Laspeyres methodology (that is, allowing for changes in the weight of
the different components of the basket). Notably, the import price index is
constructed using oil prices and the world import price index (adjusted by oil
prices) constructed by the IMF.
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Figure 10. Chile: Terms-of-Trade Indicators
Sources: Central Bank of Chile and Bennett and Valdés (2001).
A clear deterioration in the external conditions faced by the Chilean
economy was thus perceived only at the beginning of 1998. Over the
course of that year, it became clear that the external scenario was
contractionary. The initial forecast for the price of copper of $0.96 for
1998 made by the Central Bank of Chile in September of 1997 was
rapidly out of date. In January 1998, the price of copper reached its
lowest value in four years, and by the end of 1998, it was at its lowest
value since March 1987 (see table 3).
Initial conditions
The conduct of monetary policy in that uncertain environment was
unquestionably difficult. Some domestic conditions made the task more
complex, in particular the cyclical situation and the expansionary fiscal
stance at the beginning of the adjustment period. By the second quarter
of 1997, the Chilean economy was entering in a strong expansionary
cycle of domestic demand. In the second half of 1997, household
consumption grew at a rate of 10.5 percent, while investment growth
was close to 14.0 percent. Central Bank estimates made at the beginning
of 1998 indicated that the economy faced a potential deficit in the current
account of nearly 8.0 percent in 1998. This was well above what the
Central Bank considered appropriate to attain external sustainability.19
19. See “Evolución de la economía en 1999 y perspectivas para el 2000,” p. 14.
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The strong expansion in domestic demand in 1997 had a number
of causes. In the first place, large capital inflows (close to 10 percent
of GDP in 1997) played a crucial role. These capital inflows were the
consequence of relatively high domestic interest rates and
expectations of exchange rate stability. In addition, the public
perception that potential GDP growth was around 7 percent fuelled
a private consumption boom. The Central Bank of Chile and most
private observers saw the strong growth in domestic demand as
unexpected. In fact, the Central Bank gradually reduced real interest
rates during 1997 from 7.5 percent early that year to reach 6.5
percent by December. Some analysts argue that this expansionary
policy was one reason behind the domestic demand expansion. This
claim is not convincing, however, after a close look to the data. If
anything, the monetary policy seems to have been less contractionary
at that time. Several measures for the neutral real interest rate
confirm this view (see figure 11). Moreover, it is unlikely that the 1
percent change in the interest rate can significantly explain the
magnitude of the expansion.20
Figure 11. Chile: Real Interest Rate Gap Measures
Source: Central Bank of Chile (Monetary Policy Report, May 2004).
20. However, if agents had at any time perceived this policy to be unsustainable
given external conditions, it could have accelerated expenditures sizeably.
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The second domestic condition that complicated monetary policy
was an expansionary fiscal stance at the time of the external shock.
Arguably, increasing an already positive fiscal balance in a booming
economy would have been politically difficult, but the expansionary
fiscal stance clearly contributed to the growth of domestic demand.
Even at lower rates than private domestic demand, the inflationary
effects of this type of expenditure could have had significant effects.
The situation for 1998 was not different. The fiscal authority
announced cuts in expenditures, but the delay in implementing
these cuts made fiscal policy essentially expansionary in 1998 (see
figures 12 and 13).
Figure 12. Chile: Government Expenditure and GDP Growth
Sources: Central Bank of Chile and Ministry of Finance of Chile.
Additionally, the minimum wage increased substantially in May
1998. The government set an increase in the minimum wage of 12.7
percent for 1998—and the path for this wage was set for a period of
three years. The minimum wage thus increased 12.4 percent in 1999
and 10.4 percent in 2000. This policy translated into a significant
increase in the real minimum wage, which may have reduced the
labor markets’ ability to deal with the negative external shock that
the economy was facing. Moreover, average wages grew 2.5 percent
in 1997 in an environment of highly persistent growth in wages
stemming from indexation.
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Policy responses
At the end of 1997, the Central Bank of Chile intervened several
times in the exchange rate market to avoid pressures toward the
devaluation of the peso, which were associated with the uncertain
external environment stemming from the unstable situation in East
Asia. The fulfillment of the inflation target for that year was far from
secured, and additional pressures from the exchange rate on inflation
were not welcome. By the beginning of 1998, domestic demand was in a
clear expansionary path, and the international scenario was becoming
still more uncertain. The Central Bank therefore raised the interest
rate by 50 basis point on 8 January. The authorities hoped that
controlling internal demand would moderate the current account deficit
to around 4 percent of GDP for 1998 and ensure the inflation target of
4.5 percent for December 1998.
Nevertheless, doubts persisted regarding the feasibility of the
current account deficit target for the year. This triggered a first round
of speculative attacks against the peso in mid-January. The
intervention in the exchange rate market was implemented via
nonsterilized interventions. As a consequence of this strategy, the
interbank interest rate reached values over 90 percent in real annual
terms at the end of January (see figure 14). The severe liquidity
restriction raised the cost of the funds rate plus the spread above the
maximum legal rate on some days in January, which meant that
banks were unable to lend normally.
Figure 13. Chile: Fiscal Impulse
Source: International Monetary Fund.
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Figure 14. Chile: Monetary Policy Interest Rate and
Interbank Rate
Source: Central Bank of Chile.
A new increase took place on 3 February. This time the Central
Bank raised the monetary policy rate by 150 basis point. The associated
press release explicitly stated that the increase in the interest rate was
intended to bring the current account deficit to around 5 percent of
GDP. This time, however, the Central Bank made it clear that it was
targeting was the monetary policy rate.21 The Central Bank stated
that liquidity was going to be controlled to ensure the normal functioning
of the financial system with no ceiling in the behavior of the interbank
rate, which was to be determined by market forces.
Over the next few months, the Central Bank indicated that the
interventions in the exchange rate market were implemented to smooth
the fluctuations of the exchange rate. The authorities further clarified
that it was impossible for the Central Bank of Chile to affect a natural
tendency in the exchange rate.22 Nevertheless, a new round of
speculative attacks was underway by mid-June 1998. Increasingly bad
news regarding the evolution of the Japanese economy, Chile’s second
largest trade partner, generated a climate of growing uncertainty.
Doubts regarding the solvency of the Russian economy also intensified.
21. In its press release of 8 January, the Central Bank of Chile indicated that
it was willing to take the necessary actions to keep the interbank rate around 7
percent in real annual terms. However, this interest rate was never close to that
level in the second half of January 1998.
22. See El Diario Financiero, 5 July 1998.
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The Central Bank intervened again in the exchange rate market while
letting the interbank rate reach levels as high as 60 percent in real
annual terms. In late June, the Central Bank announced a set of changes
to the exchange rate regime and to the existing restrictions on capital
flows (encaje). On June 25, it considerably reduced the width of the
exchange rate band from a symmetric 12.5 percent around the center
of the band to a +2.0 percent and –3.5 percent, eliminating also the
tendency of the center of the band equal to 2 percent and maintaining
its PPP adjustment.23 The Central Bank also reduced the
nonremunerated tax on capital inflows from 30 percent to 10 percent
and started to issue dollar-denominated bonds. These actions were aimed
at reducing volatility in the financial markets. By signaling a strong
commitment with the inflation target for that year and providing
hedging instruments for the financial system, the Central Bank was
trying to decrease the pressure on the peso. These policy actions were
not sufficient to reduce this pressure, however, which led to additional
interventions in the exchange rate market and high interbank rates
during the next few weeks.
A third round of speculative attacks took place in August and
September 1998 amid devaluation expectations for many Latin
American countries and the imminent debt default by the Russian
Federation. The Central Bank intervened actively in the exchange
rate market to avoid large movements in the exchange rate. The
interbank interest rate again reached extremely high levels during
this episode. In mid-September, the Central Bank announced a series
of actions to reduce interest rate volatility and protect macroeconomic
stability. These actions included raising the monetary policy rate to
an unprecedented 14 percent in real annual terms and widening the
exchange rate band to +/– 3.5 percent, followed by a gradual increase
in the band from 3.5 percent to 5 percent by the end of 1998.24 Some
technical changes were also introduced in the way the center of the
band was adjusted over time. Finally, the Central Bank announced
the end of the nonremunerated tax (encaje).
Several factors motivated these policy actions. The Central Bank
argued that “the true dilemma was how to manage the uncertainty,
via the exchange rate or via interest rates.”25 In other words, the Central
23. The 2 percent tendency rate was toward recognising a real depreciation of
the peso.
24. In December 1998, the Central Bank of Chile introduced a new modification
to the exchange rate regime, increasing the bands to +/– 8 percent.
25. See “Evolución de la economía en 1999 y perspectivas para el 2000,” p. 19.
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Bank had to decide between letting the exchange rate depreciate or
increasing interest rates to cool down domestic demand while sustaining
the peso. The alternative of allowing the exchange rate to depreciate
was considered dangerous because it could have unanchored inflation
expectations (and ultimately effective inflation) because the inflation
target for 1998 was not likely to be reached in that context. A devaluation
of the exchange rate was expected to have a great impact on inflation
given the degree of indexation of the Chilean economy. As the Central
Bank stated, “Different estimations show a pass-through coefficient close
to 50 percent after one year, which means that a depreciation of 10
percent translates into 5 percent extra inflation… The evidence shows
that this coefficient is procyclical and could be 70 percent in a period in
which the economy is growing beyond its potential, as in the second
half of 1997… Moreover, this coefficient is higher if it operates through
expectations and costs simultaneously.”26 Given the possibility of an
exchange rate overshooting, the authority feared that being loose in
the short term would have generated a severe loss of credibility, and
that regaining it would have required tough policies in the future.27
The Central Bank also feared that a large devaluation could create
problems in firms’ balance sheets, given the mismatch generated by
seven years of real appreciation (see Morandé and Tapia, 2002; Massad,
2003a). This could have affected the general perception of the Chilean
economy. The Central Bank saw these actions as a way to help the
private sector in the process of portfolio adjustment, by providing
necessary dollars or reducing the private sector’s exposure to the
exchange rate. Finally, the Central Bank was concerned that the current
account deficit would rise beyond a level considered sustainable, of
around 4–5 percent of GDP. As mentioned before, the Central Bank
justified part of the increase in the interest rate by the need to control
the current account deficit. Levels above 6 percent of GDP were considered
to have negative effects on the economy in the long run. In summary,
the Central Bank held that the increase in interest rates to control the
growth of domestic demand, the restriction of liquidity, and the exchange
rate interventions allowed for an orderly exchange rate adjustment
without risking financial and price stability.
26. See “Evolución de la economía en 1999 y perspectivas para el 2000,” p. 17.
27. In 1997 effective inflation exceeded the target of 5.5 percent (December to
December) by 0.5 percent. While this was a small margin, the monetary policy
framework was strict regarding the annual fulfilment of the target (see Massad,
1998). As was made clear to the public, a revision of the 4.5 percent target for 1998
was impossible (see Massad’s discussion in El Diario Financiero, 20 August 1998).
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The mix of negative external shocks and the contractionary monetary
policy resulted in GDP growth of 3.2 percent in 1998 and –0.8 percent in
1999. For these years, effective GDP growth rates were 2 percentage points
and 4.5 percentage points lower than the respective projections made by
the Central Bank in September 1998. At the same time, the inflation
target was reached in the year 1998 (4.7 percent) while inflation in 1999
was 2 percent lower than the target fixed in September 1998. The current
account deficit fell to 4.9 percent in 1998 and –0.1 percent in 1999.
Determining how much of the macroeconomic performance of the
Chilean economy in that period can be attributed to policy and how
much to the external scenario is a difficult task. Nevertheless, we can
obtain some simple estimates of the monetary policy impulse by
computing simple Taylor rules. Using the interbank real interest rate
as the actual instrument for monetary policy in 1998, we find that the
different specifications for Taylor rules, which include inflation
differentials, output gaps, and the current account, cannot capture the
magnitude of the increases in the real interest rate during the first
three quarters of the year 1998 (see table 4).28
Table 4. Chile: Taylor Rules Estimationsa
Explanatory variable (1) (2) (3)
Monetary policy rate (–1) 0.609 0.613 0.644
(0.08)*** (0.06)*** (0.07)***
Inflation gap (–1) 0.165 0.154 0.128
(0.08)** (0.06)** (0.07)*
Output gap (–1) 0.218 0.170
(0.03)*** (0.03)***
Real exchange rate gap (–1) 0.076 0.085 0.073
(0.02)*** (0.02)*** (0.03)***
Current account balance -0.066 -0.145
(0.04)* (0.04)***
Dummy 1998:1 4.938 4.964 5.397
(0.24)*** (0.22)*** (0.23)***
Dummy 1998:3 9.126 9.139 9.369
(0.31)*** (0.27)*** (0.27)***
Dummy 1998:4 -3.624 -3.533 -3.614
(0.91)*** (0.78)*** (0.83)***
Summary statistic
R2 0.97 0.97 0.96
No. observations 40 40 40
Source: Authors’ calculations.
* Statistically significant at the 1 percent level.
** Statistically significant at the 5 percent level.
*** Statistically significant at the 10 percent level.
a. Quarterly estimations, 1990:1–1999:4.
28. We thank Rodrigo Caputo for providing these estimates.
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3.3 The Policy Framework since 2000
Chile began a substantial enhancement of its macroeconomic
framework in 1999, partly in reaction to the 1997–98 shock and partly
in response to the growing international consensus of the time. Five
major changes are worth singling out: the adoption of a free-floating
exchange rate regime; the deepening of the foreign exchange derivatives
(forward) market; the implementation of a full-fledged inflation-targeting
system; the introduction of an explicit fiscal policy rule for the central
government; and the full opening of the capital account.
The gradual transition to a floating exchange rate was pursued
with the widening of the exchange rate band in December 1998. Over
ten months the band’s width was increased from 7 percent to 16 percent
of the central parity, and in September 1999 the Central Bank
announced that the band was no longer part of the policy framework.
The Central Bank officially retained the authority to intervene, but it
announced that it would do so only in special circumstances, and it
would inform the public about those decisions. Parallel to this slow
transition to a floating regime—which remarkably did not entail any
especially abrupt movement in the foreign exchange rate—the Central
Bank made the regulatory adjustments necessary to foster the
development of hedges. In particular, it eased banking regulations to
allow banks to participate more actively in the forward market. Volumes
increased rapidly. Total turnover volume in the derivatives market
increased by 60 percent between 1998 and 2003, while the spot market
more than doubled (see Alarcón, Selaive, and Villena, 2004).
The inflation-targeting framework was enhanced along several
dimensions. In September 1999, an ongoing target band of 2–4 percent
was announced as the new inflation target starting in 2001 (the interim
target for December 2000 was 3.5 percent). The Central Bank began
publishing an inflation report three times a year (the first issue was
released in May 2000), announced monthly monetary policy meeting dates
six moths in advance, and disclosed monetary policy meeting minutes
with a three-month delay (which was subsequently shortened to three
weeks). Overall, it markedly improved the disclosure of information,
including detailed forecasts and views about transmission mechanisms.
Procedural changes were enacted in a new Central Bank Board ruling.
With regard to fiscal policy, the new administration announced in
2000 that it would follow a rule for determining total expenditures over
the next six years. The rule, known as the one percent structural surplus
rule, aimed at ensuring a one percent surplus for the central government
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every year based on structural revenues, measured as cycle-adjusted
tax revenues and what could be considered a normal copper price.29
The one percent target was considered necessary to cover for the
recurrent Central Bank deficit, to save copper wealth for future
generations, and to insure against contingent liabilities.30 The rule
allowed the government to better communicate the fiscal position, to
separate cyclical from structural changes, and, because it was
accompanied by an important fiscal restraint, to improve credibility.
Lastly, the capital account was completely opened in 2001, although
the Central Bank retained its faculty to impose restrictions. This move
came after years of pursuing a strategy of gradual integration, which
included a 30 percent unremunerated reserve requirement of one year
for capital inflows (in force through 1998) and several other controls,
such as a minimum stay requirement. This development was
accompanied by a lowering of restrictions on the international allocation
of funds managed by the private pension system.
3.4 The U.S. Recession and Global Uncertainty in 2001
After suffering a deep fall in GDP growth in 1999, the Chilean
economy recovered in 2000 thanks to a positive external environment
and the gradual normalization of monetary policy. The improvement in
the terms of trade, which reached levels close to those observed in the
years previous to 1996, and the strong economic expansion of commercial
partners supported this recovery. After ending 1999 with the lowest annual
inflation rate in decades, domestic prices started to increase steadily,
explained mainly by the evolution of the oil price. Nevertheless, core
inflation remained stable that year at around 3 percent .
The Central Bank decided to increase the real interest rate in
January 2000 from 5.00 percent to 5.25 percent, based on two
considerations: the economy was showing signs of becoming dynamic,
which was expected to push up costs, and the possibility that oil price
hikes might have been more persistent, which would have produced
second-order effects on inflation. Although increases in aggregate demand
remained within the limits expected by the Central Bank, oil prices fell
more slowly than expected, leading the Central Bank to increase interest
rates by an additional 25 basis points in March 2000. These policy
adjustments were expected to be consistent with inflation rates within
29. See Marcel and others (2001) for details.
30. See Ministry of Finance (2000).
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the target range in the one to two year policy horizon and with GDP
growth around 6 percent for 2000 and 2001.
External conditions started to deteriorate, however, in the second
half of 2000. The price of copper fell 27 percent between the third quarter
of 2000 and the third quarter of 2001, while the price of other important
export goods also fell. The terms of trade in goods and services fell
almost 7.5 percent in this period. International credit conditions, which
had remained tight in the previous periods, did not improve.31 In addition,
the GDP growth of trading partners reached 3.8 percent in 2000 and
then embarked on a clear path of deceleration at the end of that year,
finishing at only 1.3 percent in 2001. This fall was mainly explained by
the drastic reduction in GDP growth in the United States from 3.8
percent in 2000 to 0.3 percent in 2001.32
The external scenario was deteriorating more rapidly than expected,
which tended to push the balance of inflationary risks in a negative
direction. The Central Bank therefore implemented a reduction in
interest rate in August 2000. The Central Bank later reduced interest
rates for a total of 100 basis points in the first three months of 2001 as
inflationary expectations fall. The international scenario continued to
worsen throughout 2001, while inflation expectations continued to fall.
The Central Bank of Chile thus applied additional cuts in the interest
rate, for a total reduction of 150 basis point in the first half of the year.
The worsening in world economic perspectives and the fragile position
of some Latin American economies led the peso to depreciate almost 10
percent in two months (mid-June to mid-August).33 Because the fast
depreciation was generating excessive volatility, the Central Bank
implemented a number of actions to provide domestic financial markets
with hedging instruments and international liquidity. First, the Central
Bank increased the supply of dollar-denominated bonds by US$2 billion
in one year. Second, it assigned up to US$2 billion of international
reserves to finance spot market interventions. Finally, it indicated that
31. Moreover, as the central banks of the main economies increased interest
rates to head off inflationary pressures from the expansionary cycle, the risk
premiums paid by emerging economies increased.
32. The sharp decrease in unemployment in the United States, the evolution
of asset prices, and the significant increase in the U.S. current account deficit led
the US Federal Reserve to initiate a process of steady increases in the Federal
Funds interest rate. However, after technology asset prices collapsed in March
2000, news of a harder-than-expected landing of the U.S. economy emerged. This
deceleration materialized in 2001. The September 11 attacks and the accounting
frauds uncovered that year generated further uncertainty.
33. Moreover, the exchange rate suffered a depreciation of close to 10 percent
between February and May 2001.
109-170 A IMPRIMIR.pmd 02/03/2006, 10:51 151152 L.F. Céspedes, I. Goldfajn, P. Lowe, and R.O. Valdés
any monetary effect of these actions would be compensated in order to
keep the provision of liquidity in pesos coherent with the monetary
policy interest rate; this marked a clear divergence from previous
intervention episodes.
The exchange rate market interventions were concentrated between
September and October 2001 and involved around US$800 million (see
Tapia and Tokman, 2004). These interventions involved fewer resources
and were more effective than previous interventions. As Tapia and
Tokman (2004) argue, the fact that these interventions were announced
and explained to the public seemed to increase their effectiveness.
The combination of an expansionary monetary policy and adverse
external conditions in 2001 resulted in GDP growth of 3.4 percent.
This figure was 2 percentage points lower than expected at the end of
2000. Nevertheless, this external scenario was constructed with a 3.9
percent growth rate for the world economy, almost 2.5 percentage points
less than the actual figure. Additionally, inflation rate remained low
despite the fact that the nominal exchange rate devaluated 15 percent
in 2001. The current account deficit increased from 1 percent in 2000
to 1.7 percent in 2001.
4. CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY LESSONS
The design of policy regimes in medium-sized economies that
are well integrated into the international trading system and that
face large movements in their terms of trade or external financial
conditions (or both) poses particular challenges. An evaluation of
policy lessons must start with a description of an ideal setup—a
first-best regime—based on the experiences of Australia, Brazil, and
Chile. The first-best regime should include at least the following
elements: a floating exchange rate that helps stabilize swings in the
economy arising from the external sector; well-developed, liquid
financial markets that allow financial institutions and firms to hedge
risks arising from movements in financial prices (in particular, the
exchange rate) and make the country less vulnerable to shocks; a
credible medium-term inflation-targeting regime that anchors
inflation expectations appropriately, but at the same time allows
the central bank to respond flexibly to short-run movements in the
inflation rate; and a sustainable and credible fiscal policy, with
favorable public debt dynamics in the case of shocks.
These elements are interrelated and mutually reinforcing. For
example, well-developed financial markets and a credible monetary policy
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regime are important in allowing exchange rate movements to play an
effective, stabilizing role in the economy. While these interactions can
be helpful, they can also pose significant complications in the adoption
of a first-best regime, particularly for countries where the initial
conditions are unfavorable.
A significant number of countries have adopted inflation targeting
as their monetary framework. The three countries examined in this
study represent three different points on the path to establishing such
a regime. All three have embraced a floating exchange rate. Fiscal
policy has improved markedly in both Chile and Brazil, but the latter
still faces important challenge in reducing its debt-to-GDP ratio.
Despite the apparent framework similarities, the actual
implementation of inflation-targeting regimes has differed across
countries. Some countries, such as Chile in 1990–99, have implemented
inflation-targeting regimes that combine inflation targets with targets
for other macroeconomic variables such as the exchange rate or the
current account. These multiple objectives have sometimes come into
conflict with each another, which has heightened tension regarding
the monetary policy framework and led to changes in the framework
itself, generally in the direction of establishing the inflation rate as
the only policy target.
The experience of the three countries suggests some lessons
regarding the design of the regime and the challenges of implementation.
These are discussed below.
4.1 Size of Shocks and How to Avoid Them
Each economy faced quite different magnitudes of shock, and the
policy reactions are not easily comparable. However, shocks hitting
economies cannot be interpreted as exogenous events over a longer
horizon. The vulnerability to shocks reflects weak fundamentals and
institutions, so they cannot be taken as exogenous in the long term.
This means that learning how to respond to shocks is not sufficient. It
is important to develop institutions to reduce the frequency and
magnitude of shocks and not to delay reforms and adjustments.
For example, the crises in Brazil had severe real costs in terms of
output, real wages, and consumption growth. In the short run, these
crises may be considered as shocks: exogenous events that were beyond
the control of policymakers and the country. In the long run, however
they reflect the status of macroeconomic and institutional development.
Over time, the presence of large and frequent external shocks generates
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instability in the economy; this maps into reduced credit ratings, among
other problems. This may jeopardize the fulfillment of goals and targets,
which may in turn hurt the country’s credibility.
One can argue that the development of rules and institutions helps
smooth political transitions and creates consensus for future reforms,
which are essential ingredients for sustained growth. It takes time,
however, to establish institutions and rules since they require
credibility and are not disconnected from the culture of the country.
In Chile, the fiscal rule implemented in 2000, which ensures a
structural surplus, has allowed fiscal policy to be countercyclical. In
the case of Brazil, good examples of recently created institutions and
rules (some not completely established) are the fiscal responsibility
law, inflation targeting, the floating exchange rate regime, and fiscal
federalism. The degree of openness, flexibility, and respect of contracts
have also improved.
4.2 Initial Macroeconomic Conditions
The set of available policies after a shock depends not only on the
shock characteristics, but also on the initial macroeconomic conditions.
Furthermore, policymakers’ perceptions of certain key relationships
will shape what kind of policy reactions are considered most appropriate.
Distinguishing these conditions and characteristics is important for
drawing lessons.
Inflation level
It is important to differentiate between a situation in which inflation
is at its steady state and one in which the inflation rate is converging
toward to its long-run level. The policy responses that we analyzed in
the cases of Brazil and Chile (specifically during the Asian crisis) occurred
when the inflation rate was converging to its long-run level. This created
additional difficulties in handling the situation.
From an empirical perspective, there is evidence that the inflation
level during a shock matters for policy responses. In fact, this may
explain why Australia was able to implement a relatively more flexible
regime, and why Brazil and Chile had to increase (decrease) interest
rates more (less) during the Asian crisis (the U.S. recession). Using a
simple regression analysis to study the changes in real deposit interest
rates from the previous year for a group of inflation-targeting countries
in 1998 and 2001, we found that the inflation rate at the beginning of
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the period and the difference between this inflation rate and the inflation
target at the end of the period are positively correlated with the real
interest rate change (see table 5).34 This evidence is consistent with the
view that an unexpected shock reduces the space for flexibility in
countries with declining inflation targets. Additionally, the difference
between the inflation rate and the target can be evidence of an
unfavorable cyclical position (see below).
Table 5. Real Interest Rate Changea
Explanatory variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)




Initial inflation – Inflation 1.854 1.691
target end of period (1.11)* (1.00)*
Current account balance 0.228 -0.412 -0.285
(0.37) (0.24)* (0.23)
Growth commercial partners 0.986
(0.47)**
Terms-of-trade change -0.143 -0.350 -0.297
(0.13) (0.18)* (0.18)*
Summary statistic
R2 0.18 0.12 0.33
No. observations 36 35 36 25 25
Source: Authors’ calculations.
* Statistically significant at the 1 percent level.
** Statistically significant at the 5 percent level.
*** Statistically significant at the 10 percent level.
a. Regressions 4 and 5 are three-stage least squares estimates. Pass-through measures taken from Chouhri and
Hakura (2001) and Hausmann, Panizza, and Stein (2001).
Business cycle
The contrasting monetary policy responses of Australia and Chile
to the Asian crisis also reflect the cyclical position of each economy.
In Chile, for example, when the crisis occurred, inflation was above
the Central Bank’s announced target for 1998, and there were concerns
34. The countries considered in the analysis are Australia, Brazil, Canada,
Chile, Colombia, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Iceland, Israel, Korea, Mexico,
New Zealand, Norway, Peru, Poland, South Africa, Sweden, Switzerland,
Thailand, and the United Kingdom. The dependent variable corresponds to the
change in the real deposit interest rate in 1998 (2001) with respect to 1997
(2000), based on the World Bank’s World Development Indicators. Hence, each
country has two observations.
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about excess demand growth and its implication for the current
account deficit. In Australia, domestic growth was solid, but inflation
was below the medium-term objective partly because of a previous
appreciation of the currency. This difference in starting points
contributed to the inflationary concerns resulting from the considerably
greater depreciation in Chile than in Australia. In fact, based on the
regression analysis mentioned above, we could argue that countries
with greater deficits in their current accounts with respect to their
long-run levels experience larger (smaller) increases (reductions) in
their real interest rates (see table A1).
Pass-through from depreciation to inflation
Another difference that shapes the policy responses is the extent of
actual and perceived pass-through of exchange rate changes to CPI
inflation. In Chile, for example, a 10.0 percent depreciation of the
exchange rate might be expected to add around 5.0 percent to the CPI
within a year, whereas in Australia the figure is closer to 0.75 percent.
This more pervasive pass-through, increased according to what was
perceived, made the task of the Chilean authorities more difficult than
that of their Australian peers. Again, our simple econometric work
indicates that countries with higher pass-through experienced larger
increases in the real interest rate in 1998 and 2001 than countries
with lower pass-through (see table A1).
If pass-through is perceived as high, the central bank might be
reluctant to use the exchange rate to accommodate the negative external
shock. This policy action may lead to significant effects on the country’s
competitive stance. For example, when some of Chile’s important trade
partners experienced large depreciations during the Asian crisis, Chile’s
real exchange rate appreciated close to 4 percent between June 1997
and June 1998. Different estimations indicate that the magnitude of
the real exchange rate misalignment was between 10 and 20 percent
by mid-1998 (see Céspedes and De Gregorio, 1999; Calderón, 2004).
This misalignment suggests that the inflationary fears from the nominal
devaluation may have been overstated, as the empirical analysis
demonstrates that real exchange rate misalignment may reduce the
inflationary effects of the nominal devaluation significantly (see Céspedes
and De Gregorio, 1999; Goldfajn and Werlang, 2000).
The extent of pass through has declined over time in all three of our
country cases. One reason for this is the enhanced credibility of
monetary policy. With inflation expectations well anchored, wage
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demands now show little movement in response to changes in the
exchange rate. Moreover, price-setters often view at least some part of
exchange rate movements as temporary, and they are thus prepared to
absorb, for a time, changes in the cost of imported goods in their
margins. This experience suggests a self-reinforcing mechanism: high
credibility not only provides more flexibility, but also reduces pass-
through. The flip side of this, of course, is that low credibility leads to
high pass-through and little scope for flexibility even though the benefits
of flexibility may be high.
Financial markets, mismatches, and fear of floating
In the first-best world, terms-of-trade or external demand shocks
would be accompanied by movements in the exchange rate that help
redistribute the burden of the shock. By and large, this happened in
Australia, where exchange rate movements played an important
stabilizing role. At times large movements in the exchange rate were
somewhat uncomfortable, but overall they served the Australian
economy well. Exchange rate depreciations, in particular, were clearly
expansionary.
Exchange rate movements raised more concern in Chile and Brazil.
This partly reflects their impact on inflation, as discussed above, but
it also reflects the structure of balance sheets (of either the private or
public sector) and the development of financial markets. A critical
issue in this regard is the willingness of those outside the country to
accept local currency liabilities. In Australia’s case, foreigners have
been willing to take on Australian dollar exposures, either directly
through the bond or equity markets or indirectly through the
derivatives markets. This has allowed the exchange rate to move
considerably in response to external shocks without generating concern
about the health of domestic balance sheets. In contrast, Chile and
Brazil have much more difficulty borrowing at reasonable interest
rates in their own currencies on global capital markets.
A flexible exchange rate arrangement may provide the right
incentives to hedge the exchange rate risk. In Chile, a rigid exchange
rate may have provided lower incentives to do so. Moreover, the
authorities’ commitment to the inflation target provided space for private
agents to react to changes in the conditions that called for depreciation.
A flexible exchange rate regime has the benefit of providing the right
incentives to hedge exchange rate risk, but it requires the development
of an efficient and liquid exchange rate derivatives market.
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The role played by financial markets is crucial to understanding
the effects of external shocks in less developed economies. If financial
markets are shallow, the effects of external shocks on output,
investment, and employment are magnified by the role played by
balance sheets or the collateral of firms. Firms operating in less
developed financial markets suffer large increases in risk premiums,
which tend to reduce aggregate demand and may require a more
expansionary policy. As explained previously, however, a more
flexible response of monetary policy may undermine credibility in
those less developed countries and reduce the scope for cuts in
interest rates.
Fluctuations in the exchange rate or risk premiums (or both)
can also cause corresponding fluctuations in the debt ratio, with
more intense fluctuations for a larger share of dollar-denominated
debt (see, for example, Céspedes, Chang, and Velasco, 2004). If the
debt is perceived as unsustainable, the economy may fall into a
vicious circle of further depreciation and further increases in the
debt ratio. Monetary policy cannot work alone in such a situation:
fiscal policy needs to adjust to the permanent change in the real
exchange rate or risk premium. The lesson is that working toward
deepening financial markets may reduce vulnerability to negative
shocks and thus may help to increase the effectiveness of the
inflation-targeting regime.
Fiscal policy
The possibility of implementing a flexible inflation-targeting
regime also depends crucially on the implementation of a sustainable
fiscal policy. Fiscal institutions or arrangements play a central role
in guaranteeing the consistency and credibility of the inflation-
targeting regime. As has been extensively argued, the excessively
procyclical fiscal policies in developing countries are the consequence
of weak and deficit-prone fiscal policies. In the recent cases of
Australia and Chile, strong fiscal institutions allowed fiscal and
monetary policy to play a stabilizing role. Brazil has started to develop
fiscal arrangements that are oriented to increasing the sustainability
of the fiscal debt. The Brazilian experience shows that monetary
policy cannot work alone in the midst of a confidence crisis: fiscal
policy needs to adjust to the permanent change in the real exchange
rate or risk premiums.
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4.3 Flexibility versus Credibility
As countries have accumulated experience with inflation targeting,
they have tended to adopt flexible regimes, focusing more on medium-
term outcomes than on the permissible variation of inflation in the
short run. Theoretically, this shift offers policymakers the scope to
tolerate greater year-to-year variation in inflation and could potentially
increase economic stability without prejudicing the overall goal of
sustaining a low average inflation rate.
In the first-best world, extra flexibility can be useful for dealing
with external shocks and swings in the exchange rate.35 For example,
consider the case in which inflation is initially at the central bank’s
target, but then the terms of trade rise and the exchange rate appreciates
considerably. Inflation might be expected to fall for a couple of years as
lower import prices feed through into the CPI, before gradually picking
up as a result of the income effects of the higher terms of trade. Under
these circumstances, a strict approach to inflation targeting may require
monetary policy to be eased initially, adding to the already expansionary
effect of the higher terms of trade. Conversely, the central bank may
need to tighten its policy in response to an exchange rate depreciation
caused by an adverse external shock. In terms of overall welfare, such
responses may well be suboptimal, in that they increase the volatility
of growth without providing any benefit in terms of the average inflation
rate. In contrast, a more flexible regime might allow the central bank
to avoid easing in an expansionary environment or tightening in a
contractionary environment, thus contributing to greater stability of
both the economy and interest rates.
While such a flexible regime may be useful, it may come at a cost if
credibility has not yet been built and communication is not ideal. In
particular, it has the potential to weaken the credibility of the regime,
especially if the private sector expects the central bank to use flexibility
to avoid taking difficult decisions. For example, a decision not to increase
interest rates in response to a depreciation may be perceived as a signal
that the central bank lacks commitment to the regime. In Chile and
35. When the inflation target is strict (or short term), the exchange rate is the
only instrument that allows the monetary authority to affect inflation dynamics in
the short run. As has been documented extensively in the empirical literature, the
effects of changes in monetary policy on the output gap—and through this on
inflation—usually requires horizons longer than three quarters. Therefore, using
the interest rate to control the evolution of the exchange rate in the short run has
additional effects on activity in the medium term that must be taken into account.
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Brazil, the announcement and achievement of annual inflation targets
were very much part of the process of building credibility. Chile only
moved toward a flexible regime with medium-term targets after it
reached its long-term inflation rate and, presumably, established a
credible reputation.
One view is that if inflation is above its steady-state level, clear and
verifiable short-term targets are preferred when credibility is lacking,
but more flexibility is permitted as credibility is established. The difficulty
arises if the targets can only be achieved with a severe contraction of
the economy or if they simply become unattainable because
circumstances change. In such cases, the strict target could actually
work to undermine the credibility and durability of the regime.
For example, when Brazil faced a sudden stop that called for a
large devaluation, the Central Bank missed its inflation targets and
let the exchange rate depreciate in order to accommodate the shock
and avoid potentially large output losses. In contrast, when Chile was
confronted with a large negative external shock in 1998, the authorities
decided to adjust the interest rate to keep control of inflation.36 The
outcome of this policy was the fulfillment of the inflation target in
1998, a recession in 1999, and an inflation rate almost 2 percent lower
than the target in 1999. The long-run benefits of the two policies are
difficult to assess. However, in the case of Chile, the gains in credibility
allowed the economy to move toward a more flexible inflation-targeting
regime with well-anchored inflation expectations around the long-run
level of 3 percent.
The Australian regime was not built on achieving tightly defined
short-run targets. When the objective was initially articulated, there
was considerable skepticism about the central bank’s commitment to
it. In particular, a number of commentators noted the absence of any
institutional changes and the multiple objectives of the Reserve Bank
of Australia set out in legislation. Moreover, the fall in inflation of the
early 1990s was widely viewed as accidental, rather than the result of
a deliberate action by the Reserve Bank of Australia. In this
environment, the process of building credibility was evolutionary
rather than revolutionary. One element in this process was the
progressive upgrading of the quality and quantity of published material
on the economy and the greater focus on inflation in the Reserve Bank
36. It can be argued that a point inflation target further reduced the monetary
authority’s flexibility in dealing with the external shock. Fear of floating was also
a factor, owing to perceived foreign exchange mismatches in the corporate sector.
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of Australia’s public communication. An important period was the
tightening cycle that commenced in the second half of 1994. At that
point in time, inflation remained low although confidence that this
would be maintained was rather weak. Somewhat to the market’s
surprise, the Reserve Bank began raising interest rates in August
1994. In total, rates were increased by 275 basis points over a five-
month period to December 1994. Public communication was explicitly
forward looking, emphasizing the need to control inflation so as to
sustain growth over the longer term. The enhanced credibility of the
Reserve Bank of Australia that arose partly out of this episode was
evident in 1996 when, as interest rates were being cut, there was
very little public comment that the cuts were politically motivated,
as there had often been in the past. Another useful factor in building
credibility was the fact that the regime and the target remained
unchanged for more than a decade. Over this period, the Reserve Bank
of Australia communicated essentially the same message about its
goals and the way it operates, and the message became increasingly
ingrained in the way the public thinks about monetary policy. There
is little, if any, public discussion on the need to change the framework
or the numerical objective.
In Brazil, inflation targeting (coupled with a floating exchange rate
regime) helped absorb the severe shocks that hit the economy, while at
the same time keeping inflation under control. The latter was an essential
ingredient for producing the real exchange rate depreciation (as opposed
to nominal depreciation only) and, therefore, the external adjustment.
Following the depreciation, the Central Bank assessed the nature and
persistence of the shock; it then built different inflation and output
trajectories associated with different interest rate paths, and it chose the
optimal path for output and inflation based on its aversion to inflation
variability. If the shock is abnormally large or persistent, its inflationary
effect may last more than a year, so the optimal inflation path may
imply a twelve-month-ahead inflation above the previous annual target.
In such a case it is neither possible nor optimal to blindly pursue the
central point of the old target: the target should be adjusted to take into
account the effects of the change in relative prices. Eventually, inflation
must converge to its target path, albeit at longer horizons.
Of course, some credibility costs are always associated with
breaching original targets. The decision to neutralize the shock over a
longer horizon, based on an evaluation of the size and persistence of the
shock, may lead to time consistency issues: too much accommodation
in the short run leads to loss of credibility in the long run. Given the
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size of the shocks, however, a decision to keep the old target could also
imply a loss of credibility because it might be considered unattainable.
Therefore, it is essential that the whole procedure be explained publicly
in considerable detail, so that agents can effectively judge whether the size
and persistence of the shock justify the decision taken by the central bank.
Transparency, therefore, imposes enough discipline to avoid time-
consistency issues. Nevertheless, agents find it difficult to evaluate the
results conditional on the environment where policymakers operate.
The optimal degree of flexibility may also depend on the initial
macroeconomic conditions. In the first-best world, countries with a high
degree of pass-through probably stand to gain more from a flexible
approach to inflation targeting than those with low pass through. Since
these countries are likely to demonstrate more short-term volatility in
their inflation rate, additional flexibility increases the probability that
they will not be drawn into the type of suboptimal policy responses
discussed above. Again, the difficulty arises where credibility is weak.
In such cases, the needed flexibility cannot be used for fear of
undermining confidence in the regime.
4.4 Responding within an Established Framework
An important element for any monetary policy framework to be
useful is stability. Policy actions that are well understood by the public
and are inserted within the framework are more effective than opaque
policy actions, as they also operate through the expectations of private
agents. Policy actions that are not consistent with the framework are
likely to create uncertainty. Accordingly, policy changes or changes in
the framework are likely to generate uncertainty and expectations of
further adjustments.
The experience of the three countries in this matter is illustrative.
Chile’s changes to the exchange rate band in 1998 may have stirred
expectations of further changes, while letting the interbank interest
rate drift away from the announced target probably created uncertainty
regarding the monetary policy direction. In the case of Brazil, part of
the framework was being built as policymakers were facing the shocks
(for example, how much to accommodate and the appropriate horizon
in which inflation should converge to the target path). The policy
reactions in Australia and in Chile in 2002 were part of the same
framework, built in advance and, probably, well understood. The
challenge, therefore, is to develop sufficiently resilient frameworks so
that policy reactions can be predictable as a contingency.
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APPENDIX
Supplementary Tables
Table A1. Inflation Targeting In Australia, Brazil and Chile:
Main Characteristics
Characteristic Australia Brazil Chile
Independence of Central Bank:
Formal Yes No Yes
Targets No Yes
Instruments Yes Yes
Absence of conflicts with Yes Yes Yes (previously:
other goals exchange rate band
until Sept. 1999)
Price measure CPI , excludes CPI CPI
for inflation target cost of interest
Date of adoption Jun-93 June 1999 Sept. 1990
Annual inflation at adoption 1.0% 3.3% 17.0%
of inflation targeting framework
Target Range: 2–3% Range:  Range: 2–4%
3–8% (2004); (previously:
2–7% (2005);  point, 1995–99)
2.5–6.5% (2006)




Years of convergence since - - 9 years
adoption to the steady state




Publication of board minutes No Yes Yes (since 2000)
Publication of inflation forecasts Yes Yes Yes (since 2000)
Publication of inflation report Yes Yes Yes (since 2000)
Accountability Parliament Finance Minister Parliament
Sources: Massad (1998); Morandé (2001); Schmidt-Hebbel and Tapia (2002); Reserve Bank of Australia; Central
Bank of Brazil.
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Table A2. Australia, Brazil and Chile: Economic Indicators
Indicator* Australia Brazil Chile
Gross domestic product (PPP) per capita 27,818 8,015 9,992
(U.S. dollars)
Financial markets depth
Domestic credit provided by banking sector (% GDP) 93.9 64.8 77.6
Rule of lawa 6.0 2.4 5.0
Foreign exchange turnover (% GDP) 19.1 2.0 8.2
Creditors right indexb 3.0 1.0 2.0
Interest rate spreadc 5.0 43.7 4.0
Risk premium on lendingd 3.3 37.6
Opennesse 33.5 24.3 55.2
Net external debt (% GDP) 48.9 40.0
External debt in local 27.5 0.0 0.0
currency (% total)
Net public debt (% GDP) 5.3 57.6 14.5
Sources: IMF, World Economic Outlook; IMF reports; International Credit Risk Guide; World Bank, World
Development Indicators; Bank for International Settlements.
a. Assessment of the tradition of law and order in the country on a scale from 0 to 6, with lower values representing
a weaker tradition of law and order.
b. Minimum score of 0 represents weak creditor rights; maximum score of 4 represents strong creditor rights.
c. Lending rate minus deposit rate.
d. Prime lending rate minus the U.S. Treasury bill rate.
e. Sum of merchandise exports and imports divided by the value of GDP, all in current U.S. dollars.
* Period: 2001-2003.
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